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Abstract 
Voluntary environmental governance arrangements (VEGAs) have focal attention in 
academic and policy debates. The current literature expresses high expectations, but 
empirical findings show that VEGAs are often unsuccessful in achieving significant 
levels of improved environmental performance by their participants. At the same time 
the literature reports an ongoing use of them. Based on a study of fifteen VEGAs in 
the Australian buildings sector this research paper aims to understand whether 
VEGAs may have positive effects, but without showing direct measurable results in 
terms of high(er) levels of environmental performance. Four subtle roles of VEGAs 
are uncovered: transformation of norms; providing business cases; filling in voids in 
governmental requirements; and, facilitating the implementation of governmental 
requirements. 
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1 Introduction 
Voluntary environmental governance arrangements (VEGAs) aim to address 
undesirable outcomes in society through collectively agreed rules, but without the 
force of law. VEGAs are a broad range of governance arrangements characterized 
by ‘a move away from traditional state-led regimes; the involvement of public and 
private sector stakeholders in rule making and rule implementation; more 
collaborative policy processes; and, governance instruments that are less rigid, less 
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, foster experimentation, and are 
less hierarchical in nature’ (Van der Heijden, 2012, 486-87). The debate on VEGAs 
has a long history and covers much ground (for recent reviews of the literature, see 
Potoski, 2011; Van der Heijden, 2012).  
Two major issues stand out in the current literature. First, research reports an 
ongoing use of VEGAs, and on normative grounds speaks positively of their potential 
in terms effectiveness and efficiency (Hoffmann, 2011; Koehler, 2007). Following this 
literature, it may be concluded that, at least on the short term, VEGAs are a political 
reality and are likely to mushroom even further in different countries and sectors 
(however, see counterclaims in Toller, 2008). Second, empirical studies find that 
individual VEGAs achieve, at best, moderate success in improving the environmental 
performance of their participants (for reviews, see Darnall and Sides, 2008; Khanna 
and Brouhle, 2009; Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Morgenstern and Pizer, 2007). Yet, 
these latter studies may be criticised for excluding interaction effects between 
VEGAs and environmental legislation (e.g. Trubek and Trubek, 2007), for excluding 
positive spill-over effects of VEGAs from participants to non-participants (e.g. Reid 
and Toffel, 2009), and for downplaying the value of VEGAs as policy experiments 
(e.g. Hoffmann, 2011). This is partly a consequence of the tendency in the literature 
to study individual VEGAs in isolation from the larger institutional settings they are 
embedded in (Van der Heijden, 2012). 
In short, much remains to be done in terms of mapping the role of VEGAs in 
larger systems of environmental governance. This paper attempts to take up a small 
part of this huge challenge by examining the development and implementation of a 
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range of VEGAs in the Australian building sector (here defined as the construction 
and use of buildings). The paper begins by briefly discussing the backdrop against 
which these VEGAs have emerged – the requirements of environmental practice in 
the building sector set by Commonwealth, State and Territory, and local 
governments. It then introduces the various VEGAs studied and analyses their 
development and implementation. In line with earlier research, this paper finds that 
the VEGAs studied have individually achieved, at best, moderate results in terms of 
buildings built (or retrofitted) with high levels of environmental performance. Yet, in 
implementation they are found to have added to a changed norm towards 
environmental performance in the sector. Further, through these VEGAs, business 
cases are developed, which are of importance to convince laggards in the sector to 
make a move to higher levels of environmental performance. Finally, the VEGAs 
studied are considered important to fill in the voids left open by governmental 
requirements, and to facilitate the sector in meeting governmental requirements. The 
paper concludes with these main lessons learnt. 
 
 
 
 
2 Environmental governance in the Australian building sector 
The typical characteristics of the building sector make the environmental problems it 
faces severely complex: (i) the environmental harms of the sector spread out and 
relate to other sectors – such as transport and industry; (ii) buildings often have a 
long life span, which implies that their environmental impact lasts for decades – or 
are only considered problematic long after the building is erected; (iii) the sector is 
highly fragmented, with a wide range of professionals, suppliers, consumers, and 
financiers involved; (iv) the assumed causes of and solutions to the harms are an 
interplay of technology and behaviour; and (v) there are high economic interests at 
stake and strong lobby groups at play, which often makes it hard for policy makers to 
introduce costly requirements that aim to improve the environmental performance of 
the sector (here, this paper provides a snapshot of the problems; for good reviews 
on ‘greening’ the building sector, see  Abaire, 2008; Hoffman and Henn, 2009). This 
is not to say that these problems cannot be addressed by traditional government 
intervention; indeed, various levels of Australian government have aimed to do so. 
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2.1 Commonwealth government 
With the passing of the Clean Energy Act in 2012, the Australian Commonwealth 
government has sent a clear message regarding their ambitions in addressing 
climate change. The Act states the need for an overall 20% reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050, compared to the levels in 2000 (Australian Parliament, 
2011). One of the most relevant aspects of the Clean Energy Act is the pricing of 
carbon that is released into the atmosphere – popularly referred to as ‘carbon tax’.  
Various organizations within the Australian building sector (representing different 
trades, investors, and property owners) have welcomed this carbon tax, stating that 
the carbon tax may be a major incentive for the improvement of the environmental 
performance of the Australian building sector (Allen Consulting Group, 2011; 
ASBEC, 2008; CIE, 2011; GBCA, 2011). Yet, this carbon tax only works indirectly in 
the building sector. It does not mandate builders, building owners, or investors to 
achieve certain results in terms of high levels of environmental performance of 
buildings, or how to achieve such results. However, such requirements also exist. 
From 2003 onwards, various energy efficiency requirements have been 
introduced in the Building Codes of Australia, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions attributable to the operation of buildings; these requirements have 
increased in stringency over time (ABCB, 2010). Further, in 2009 a National 
Partnership Agreement on Energy Efficiency was signed by the State and the 
Commonwealth Government, which again introduced more stringent standards to 
the energy efficiency of buildings (COAG, 2009). Finally, since 2010, under the 
Building Energy Disclosure Act 2010, disclosure of the energy performance of 
commercial office spaces larger than 2,000m2 is mandatory. It is expected that such 
information supply helps (future) tenants to compare commercial buildings when 
deciding to start or extend a lease. 
 
 
2.2 State/Territory and local governments 
State and Territory governments also aim to manage the environmental performance 
of the building sector within their jurisdictions. These governments can stipulate the 
environmental performance of (future) buildings on a particular site, the density of 
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development, or set limits to the spread of urban regions (Thompson, 2007). Further, 
the Commonwealth government has required all State and Territory governments to 
prepare overarching strategic plans for their capital cities to ensure a clear set of 
short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives. This has resulted in a range of highly 
ambitious City plans that provide clarity to both (private sector) investors and the 
public on how public funds will be spent (COAG, 2012). These City plans test the 
boundaries in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the part the building 
sector plays in achieving this objective. They are of interest because they set 
significantly higher goals than the Commonwealth policies, aim to achieve these 
goals on shorter terms, and provide space for experimentation and innovation in 
doing so. For instance, the City of Sydney aims to reduce greenhouse gasses by 
70% by 2030, based on 2006 levels (City of Sydney, 2011), and the City of Brisbane 
by 50% by 2026, based on 2006 levels (City of Brisbane, 2006). Another key 
characteristic of these plans is that they were developed in close collaboration with 
business and citizen participation. These deliberative city planning processes fit a 
larger tendency described in the city planning literature (e.g. Evans, Joas, Sundback, 
and Thobald, 2005). 
 
 
2.3 Critical studies 
Despite the above discussion, it is often considered that the Commonwealth 
government’s involvement is too limited to truly address the real problems faced in 
the Australian building sector. From 2000 onwards, a series of studies has been 
undertaken to gain a better understanding of the key-issues in the sector that need 
attention in addressing environmental risks (for an overview, see Bond, 2011). Two 
conclusions recur (AGO, 2006; Johanson, 2011; Maller and Horne, 2011): (i) existing 
policies, legislative requirements, and regulations do not pay enough attention to 
potential improvements in the environmental performance of the residential sector, 
and (ii) they do not pay enough attention to the existing building stock. 
Further, the initiatives on the regional and local levels also face severe 
critique (e.g. COAG, 2012; EDO, 2010; Thomas, 2010). These initiatives are 
predominantly critiqued because they are often not mandatory. Their success 
depends on political will and the transposition of the ambitious goals in regulation or 
other instruments. To date, there is little evidence available to suggest that these 
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initiatives have achieved any environmental improvement in general, and in the 
building sector in particular. 
 
 
3 VEGAs in the Australian building sector: Unpacking the problem and 
filling in voids 
Against the above backdrop, a range of VEGAs studies has emerged in the 
Australian building sector. These VEGAs aim to improve the environmental 
performance of new or existing buildings, but all have a different approach in doing 
so. To understand why these are implemented and how they perform, a series of 
VEGAs is studied in the Australian building sector. 
 
3.1 Research design 
The research presented largely builds on a stratified sample of fifteen VEGAs, which 
canvases the type and content of these arrangements in the Australian building 
sector. In order to understand the development process of the VEGAs, their 
particular form, and the role they play in environmental governance in this sector, a 
series of in-depth face-to-face interviews was carried out. Interviewees were 
indentified using snowball sampling and selected for their in-depth understanding of 
one or more VEGAs. This sampling resulted in 53 interviewees from various 
backgrounds – i.e., policy makers, administrators, investors, developers, architects, 
engineers, and property owners. It should be noted that that the interviewees were 
often aware of and involved in more than one arrangement. It is expected that this 
(partly) helps to overcome a sampling bias of arrangement administrators who are 
overly enthusiastic about their ‘own’ arrangement. Interestingly, many of these 
administrators were critical of the arrangements in which they were involved. Table 1 
provides insight into the background of these interviewees. 
 
**** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire which provided a structure 
of checks and balances to assess the validity of findings (see appendix A). 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed into a report that was sent back to 
interviewees for validation. The data were processed by means of a systematic 
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coding scheme based on a large review of the VEGA literature (Van der Heijden, 
2012; see appendix B), and qualitative data analysis software was used for an 
analysis of the data – the program Atlas.ti. By using this approach, the data were 
systematically explored and insight was gained into the ‘repetitiveness’ and ‘rarity’ of 
experiences shared by the interviewees. Finally, a document study of existing 
information on these fifteen VEGAs and existing research on VEGAs was carried out 
to cross-check the validity of the data and findings (methodology based on Seale, 
Gobo, Gubrium, and Silverman, 2004). 
The following provides a broad overview before focusing on the details: the 
disparate VEGAs address different aspects of the larger complex environmental 
problem that the building sector poses. They have unpacked this larger problem into 
smaller and more manageable problems, and specific problem owners have come 
together to solve these. Table 2 provides an overview of the VEGAs studied. 
 
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
3.2 Addressing first-mover disadvantages 
Traditional direct government involvement may be critiqued for only aiming to bring 
laggards up to the required standards (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002). Leadership 
is needed to experiment with new approaches in addressing environmental 
problems, which may ultimately become the new norm or benchmark.  First-mover 
disadvantages may, however, stand in the way of actors’ opportunity to show 
leadership. First-mover disadvantages relate to the financial, legislative, and cultural 
risks organizations face when bringing a new product or service to the market 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). That is, the new product or service may be 
considered too expensive by clients, it may conflict with existing legislation, or it may 
face resistance when it is considered ‘ahead of its time’, or ‘too fast for the market’ 
(Robinson and Min, 2002).  
 Three types of VEGAs in the Australian building sector address such first-
mover disadvantages: best-performance grants, intensive regulatory support, and 
best-of class benchmarking.  
 
 
Best- performance grants 
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Addressing first-mover disadvantages through subsidies is a well-known tool in 
environmental governance (e.g. Stewart, 2006); for instance, the provision of 
subsidies to households and firms for the instalment of solar panels. Yet, questions 
have arisen as to how successful traditional subsidies are in improving 
environmental performance, and sometimes it is even argued that subsidies may be 
harmful in doing so (Pearce, Porter, Steenblik, Pieters, and Potier, 2003). To 
address these problems and aim to make recipients of financial support to move 
beyond mere bottom-line compliance with the financial arrangements’ rules (e.g., 
merely installing solar panels), a range of Australian governments have introduced 
best-performance grants. Best-performance grants challenge recipients to come up 
with innovative solutions to achieve high environmental performance of their (future) 
buildings. Competition among the grant-applicants is expected to raise the bar of 
these solutions.1 
Typically, these best-performance grants are initiated and administered by 
local or state governments. They are the result of a collaborative development 
process in which these governments work together with businesses and non-
government organizations. A representative example is South Australia’s Buildings 
Innovation Fund, where the state government collaborates with the Adelaide City 
Council, the Property Council (a building sector interest group), and the University of 
South Australia to develop grant criteria and assess applications. The strength of 
these grants, as explained by a grant administrator, is that the outcomes provide 
‘solid business cases that innovative solutions to reduce carbon emissions [in the 
building sector] can be cost-effective’ (South Australian Department of the 
Environment and Natural Resources, 22/3/2012 #51). 
 
 
Intensive regulatory support 
Besides providing funds to limit or take away first-mover financial risks, governments 
may support first-movers by removing legislative barriers (Frynas, Mellhali, and 
Pigman, 2006). The building sector is notorious for legislative barriers that hamper 
improved environmental performance (cf. Bond, 2011); for instance, with current 
technologies it is possible to reclaim and reuse wastewater; however, sewage and 
                                               
1 Former and present grant administrators in Adelaide, 22/3/2012 #51; Brisbane, 31/1/2012 #27; Melbourne, 
4/10/2011 #13. 
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drinking-water regulations often prevent this technology from being implemented 
(e.g. Power, 2010).  
Through intensive regulatory support, the Queensland Government provides 
regulatory relief to applicants of development proposals that aim to be leaders in 
terms of environmental performance. The Queensland Government works 
collaboratively with the development industry, local governments, and referral 
agencies to identify the most sustainable development proposals in Queensland and 
helps these organizations to overcome regulatory barriers. Under this VEGA, 
development proposals that are identified as ‘the most sustainable in Queensland’ 
are fast-tracked in order to ensure that ‘exemplary sustainable developments [are] 
delivered sooner throughout Queensland’ (Queensland Government, 2011, 4). Or, in 
the words of a representative of a property and development interest group:  
  
It was an acknowledgement that if they [the government] want to reach a 
certain state of outcomes, they need to make it easier for the people to go 
through the system (Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2/2/2012 
#31). 
 
Reducing or taking away legal barriers in building permitting may be considered 
a promising approach to support leaders in the industry (also, Decker, 2003). 
However, interviewees questioned the effectiveness of this approach in terms of 
achieving a large number of buildings constructed. That is, the majority of developers 
and constructors were said to consider building regulations as the lowest common 
denominator to meet, and not as something to voluntarily move beyond (also, Van 
der Heijden, 2009).  
 
Best-of-class benchmarking 
Again, another way of overcoming first-mover disadvantages is through information 
supply, and this is what best-of-class benchmarking aims to achieve. VEGAs fitting 
this type allow for the comparison of buildings against each other based on their 
environmental performance. These arrangements rate the environmental 
performance of buildings on a certain scale – e.g., the number of stars indicates a 
certain performance. Criteria against which buildings are assessed are set by the 
arrangement’s administrator, and assessment is generally carried out by a third party 
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certifier. In order to meet a particular level of certification, a building must meet a 
number of criteria. The more criteria are met, the higher the level of certification. 
Generally the building owner or designer is left to choose a certain mix of criteria to 
meet and reach a particular level of certification (e.g. Cooper and Symes, 2009). 
Two voluntary benchmarking arrangements have emerged in Australia: Green Star 
and EnviroDevelopment. 
 Green Star was introduced in 2002 by the Australian Green Building Council 
(GBCA) – a public company limited - whose board members represent industries 
and governments. One of the drivers of its development was a report by the 
Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO, 1999), which identified the office market as an 
area where, in terms of greenhouse gas emission reductions, much gains were to be 
expected against limited costs. Different actors in the industry considered this as a 
possible profitable market, and aimed to develop a label that would distinguish their 
buildings as performing well above the Building Code of Australia (cf. Heyes and 
Maxwell, 2004). The VEGA is mostly applied in the commercial office market 
EnviroDevelopment is developed and administrated by the Urban 
Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) – a not-for-profit industry body. When 
implementing EnviroDevelopment in 2009, it was aimed at the residential sector, 
which then was a niche market left aside by Green Star.2 Over the years, however, 
EnviroDevelopment has broadened its scope and now addresses commercial 
buildings as well. 
 
 
3.3 Addressing split incentives 
Another particular problem in the building sector is split incentives (cf. Abaire, 2008; 
Hoffman and Henn, 2009). The costs of environmental underperformance (electricity, 
heating, water use, etc.) often come to building users, therefore developers and 
owners often do not see a need to improve the environmental performance of 
buildings as they do not bear the costs of underperformance. The VEGAs studied 
address these split incentives by financially supporting building owners in improving 
the environmental performance of their (future) buildings, and by supporting building 
users in achieving such improvements in the buildings they lease. 
                                               
2 EnviroDevelopment administrator, Brisbane, 2/2/2012 #30. 
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Tripartite financing 
Property owners often cannot find the necessary financing to upgrade their buildings. 
Banks are risk averse in supplying mortgages as the cost of the upgrade is not (yet) 
represented in an increase in the building’s market value (cf. Pivo, 2010). 
To address this particular issue, the cities of Melbourne and Sydney have 
introduced VEGAs based on tripartite financing. In both cities, the particular 
arrangements are founded in their overall city planning strategy, as described above. 
The arrangements address the specific financing problem, but also provide a strong 
tool for governments to achieve results. As an administrator explained: 
 
[T]he voluntary needs to come with a tangible benefit. If you step back 
a bit you find that governments need to find out what their value 
proposition is. Without the [tripartite financing] our value proposition 
was limited to promotion, networks and knowledge.  The finance 
incentive has created a strong value proposition and something that 
many Melbourne building owners are interested in (Melbourne City 
Council, 17/1/2012 #26). 
 
These VEGAs bring together local councils, a national bank, a major fund manager, 
the Australian Carbon Trust, and property owners in the cities’ central business 
districts. The VEGA is a vehicle to allow the local councils to enter into agreements 
with building owners and finance providers as a way of funding works to improve the 
environmental performance of those buildings. Under these VEGAs, the finance 
provider lends funds to a building owner for environmental upgrades to its buildings, 
and this loan is repaid through a local council charge on the land – i.e., the local 
council charges a fee, which is then used to pay off the loan. The agreement states 
the future environmental performance that is to be achieved, and stipulates a time 
frame for achieving this result (NSW Government, 2010). 
 
 
Information networks 
Tenants are often unaware as to how to improve their environmental performance. 
CitySwitch Green Office, implemented throughout Australia, addresses this issue. 
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The VEGA aims to make tenants aware of the energy they use and how they can 
reduce this. It is administrated by local councils and state governments and serves 
as a platform for office tenants to learn about energy efficiency, share information, 
network, and showcase good practices. It further helps tenants to put pressure on 
their landlords to improve the environmental performance of their buildings. 
In participating in the arrangement, office tenants come to agreements with 
councils on their future environmental performance, and the council then provides 
support to help them to meet these goals. Certain councils provide financial support; 
others facilitate meetings and ensure an ongoing supply and distribution of 
information.3 In return for signing off an agreement with a local council on future 
targets to be met, participants may use the promotional CitySwitch Green Office 
logo, and early awards have been introduced to recognize leading practice.4 The 
ability to showcase leadership is considered a strong driver for participation:  
 
It is about leadership, it is about being seen to participate. … The 
program helps leaders to feel good about what it is they are doing, and 
to have a place to speak about it (Sydney City Council, 15/2/2012 #41). 
 
 
Elite networks 
In achieving a high overall environmental performance of the building sector, it is 
important to move beyond the level of individual buildings. In particular, the 
interaction of infrastructure such as water and electricity supply, sewage and waste 
collection, and transport of people and goods to and from buildings has a significant 
impact on the environmental performance of buildings. When making investments in 
future infrastructure, cities may wish to know whether building owners and 
developers are willing to move to higher performing buildings, and if so, the 
necessary requirements for them to do so. Building owners may wish to be informed 
on the direction a city may take in its infrastructure investments and legislative 
framework before making investments to improve their buildings’ environmental 
performance. That is, for property owners it is important to have certainty about a 
city’s future policies as these will strong impact on the value of their building portfolio 
                                               
3 City Switch administrators in Sydney 15/2/2012 #41; Adelaide 21/3/2012 #50; and Brisbane 3/2/2012 #35. 
4 www.cityswitch.net.au  
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and future investment decisions. 
 For governments, the most direct way of engaging with businesses is by 
bringing them together to start a debate. This is what the Better Buildings 
Partnership aims to achieve. The underlying assumption of such collaborative 
approaches is that participants will be more willing to comply with an agreement 
made, as opposed to operating under a traditional top-down regulatory approach. 
This is because they have been involved in the design of the arrangement and as 
such are, or at least may feel responsible for, its outcomes (cf., Schot and Holder, 
2006). This VEGA is an elite network of the City of Sydney, including 13 major 
commercial landlords representing approximately 60% of the office floor space 
across Sydney’s central business district. The Partnership was started in 2011 
following examples in London and Toronto.5 It recognizes that although commercial 
property owners have the ability to make major improvements to their individual 
buildings, they and the City of Sydney can achieve greater results if they collaborate. 
As an administrator of the Partnership explained:  
 
[T]here is only so much they can do with their own portfolio and their 
own buildings. The next jump [can only be achieved] by actually 
working together (Sydney City Council, 16/2/2012 #42).  
 
The Partnership builds on a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the 
various parties, stating that the property owners commit to the City’s vision (the 
earlier discussed Sydney City plan) and the city will support them in doing so. Being 
involved in the policy making process, public recognition and peer-pressure appear 
strong drivers for property owners to join and participate. A representative of one of 
the participating landlords highlighted the reason for their involvement:  
 
The value for us is in being at the table with our competitors and peers. 
I’m not sure what other value actually comes from the initiative than 
just being a part of what everybody is a part of at the moment (Sydney 
based landlord, 17/02/2012 #44). 
 
                                               
5 www.sydneybetterbuildings.com.au 
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3.4 Addressing residential buildings 
A final particular problem addressed in the series of VEGAs studied is the difficulty of 
improving the environmental performance of residential buildings. Two specific 
issues stand in the way for doing so. First, existing property rights mean that many 
existing buildings, in particular residential buildings, do not have to meet new and 
more stringent environmental regulations (ABCB, 2011). Second, changing the 
environmental behaviour of households (as users of residential buildings) is 
hampered by their awareness of the environmental problems faced and their 
willingness and ability to change their behaviour (Berglund and Matti, 2006). This 
challenge is strengthened as the information available on both the environmental 
problems faced and the possibilities for change is highly complex (Hoffman and 
Henn, 2009). An obvious and oft chosen approach to increase the knowledge of 
households on environmental problems is information campaigns (Stewart, 2006). 
However, such campaigns are often found to have a limited effect (Henry and 
Gordon, 2003).  
 
Intensive behavioural interventions6 
In order to overcome the limitations of one-way information supply, a series of 
VEGAs aim to make households aware of their behaviour and environmental 
performance, and to provide them with tools for improvement. Generally, a 
consultant visits a household and audits the household’s environmental performance 
(e.g., based on their energy and water bills). Following the audit, the consultant 
advises the household as to how it can improve its environmental performance and 
supplies the household with actual means to do so.7 A former administer of one of 
the VEGAs studied explained:  
 
Basically it was advice over a cup of coffee. Measuring the flow rate 
out of the showerhead, changing the showerhead if necessary, or 
putting some compact fluorescent light bulbs in, or looking at the fridge 
seals. Very basic things. […] And it may not be the thing that makes 
the big difference, but it is about engaging people in that. It is an initial 
                                               
6 A term I borrowed from the field of psychology (e.g. Howlin, Magiati, and Charman, 2009). 
7 Administrators in Melbourne, 03/10/2011 #11; Brisbane, 31/01/2012 #27; and, Adelaide, 22/03/2012 #51. 
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behaviour change. And if they in their own minds start to see 
themselves as energy consumers and conservers, that can lead to 
bigger and more successful changes (South Australian Department of 
the Environment and Natural Resources, 22/03/2012 #51). 
 
 
4 Analysing the VEGAs: A story of limited success and mixed 
expectations 
Fully in-line with earlier studies on VEGAs, individually the VEGAs studied have 
achieved limited success in terms of numbers of buildings built or retrofitted with high 
levels of environmental performance.  To give some examples, in its ten years of 
existence roughly 500 projects have been certified under the Green Star 
arrangement, representing 18% of Australia’s central business district office space 
(GBCA, 2012); since its initiation in 2009, roughly 40 projects have been certified 
under the EnviroDevelopment arrangement;8 roughly 350 tenants, representing 
about 400 office buildings, have entered into agreements with local councils under 
CitySwitch; less than 10 Environmental Upgrade Agreements have been signed in 
Sydney, and less than 50 buildings currently participate in the 1200 buildings 
arrangements in Melbourne.9  Although some of the numbers are respectable at first 
glance, they nevertheless are bleak in contrast with the vast size of the Australian 
building sector. For instance, in the state of Victoria only about 45,000 residential 
buildings are built yearly and Australia currently holds about 4,500 office buildings.10 
Interviewees were critical regarding the impact of the VEGAs in terms of numbers of 
buildings built or retrofitted (n=31, 58%). Nevertheless, they speak positively about 
the VEGAs’ impact on the building sector. 
 
 
4.1 Changing the norm 
There is consensus amongst the interviewees that these VEGAs have achieved 
more than ‘just’ a number of buildings with a high level of environmental 
performance. A group of interviewees hold the opinion that VEGAs in the Australian 
                                               
8 Note: a project may consist of more than one building. 
9 VEGA administrators in Sydney, 15/2/2012 #39; Brisbane, 2/2/2012 #30; Sydney, 15/2/2012 #41; Sydney, 
16/2/2012 #42; Melbourne, 17/1/2012 #26. 
10 Data from www.hia.com.au, www.pulse.buildingcommission.com.au and www.propertyoz.com.au. 
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building sector have added to a changed norm of developing high performing 
buildings (n=30, 57%): 
 
The strength of [VEGAs] like this is that it creates a culture and a sense 
of this [high environmental performance in the building sector] is the 
normal way to do it (Sydney City Council, 15/02/2012 #34). 
 
You get to a tipping point where it becomes the norm. So we don’t 
have to actually intervene into what will happen naturally. It is about 
chipping away, and it is about finding our niches - where can we value 
add or facilitate [through VEGAs] (Brisbane City Council, 31/1/2012 
#27). 
 
The cycle is very long, but the [commercial] projects that you see in the 
last two or three years… I would say it is almost the norm of any 
project that you see, that it has on its very first page of the brochure 
that it has these features [as stipulated under a VEGA] (Urban 
Development Institute of Australia, 2/2/2012 #31). 
 
That being said, this changed norm was only perceived in the top-end of the 
commercial building sector where large property owners and developers see the 
advantage of attracting clients that are willing to pay for the extra costs of buildings 
with high levels of environmental performance. In other areas of the building sector, 
and especially in the residential sector, interviewee accounts report limited success 
as the owners of this property type do not see the economic value of high 
environmental performance of their buildings.  As an interviewee explained:  
 
However, I should note that we are talking about the top-end of town 
here [where VEGAs are taken up]; for instance, government, blue-chip 
companies, financial institutions, lawyers, and accounting firms. But 
there is another level where the consumer does not currently see the 
benefit of [sustainable buildings] and they don’t want to pay for it. And 
even if they do see the benefit, they probably are not willing to pay a 
premium for it. This is the next major challenge (Lend Lease [major 
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developer], 17/2/2012 #47). 
 
In relation to the above issue, interviewees stated the importance of VEGAs in 
providing business cases for the building sector, to ‘push the envelope of what can 
be done’ and to ‘show the industry that innovation can be cost-effective’ (South 
Australian Department of the Environment and Natural Resources, 22/03/2012 #51). 
Within the building sector, such business cases appear crucial in achieving a move 
towards higher levels of environmental performance. An interviewee noted the 
following: 
 
It is pretty much critical mass. If you are doing a commercial building … 
you take a commercial risk to not go Green Star [one of the VEGAs 
studied] rated at the moment. And this is because it is now a bit of a 
default. If it is not Green Star it is considered [lesser] from the day it is 
built. There it is. That market is hit ... but this does not relate to the 
residential market. It is not proven residents want to pay for it. It is not a 
clear business-case (Australian Green Development Forum, 1/2/2012 
#29). 
 
 
4.2 The limits of VEGAs 
Whilst this group was positive about the role VEGAs have played in changing the 
norm in the Australian building sector, another group of interviewees was critical 
regarding what it is VEGAs may achieve. There was a shared perception among 
these interviewees that VEGAs are insufficient in addressing those areas in the 
building sector where a business case for higher levels of environmental 
performance is absent. Here, interviewees argued that government intervention 
through regulation may be needed (n=30, 57%): 
 
The speed in which we react is out of sync with the problems we face. 
Although a lot of voluntary programs make sense, they are not fast 
enough in addressing problems. Regulation is needed. Yes, there is 
much change to be seen over the last ten years, but change has only 
occurred in the top-end of the construction market (Australian Green 
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Development Forum, 1/2/2012 #29). 
 
Mandatory is the way to go. And that probably is a funny answer from 
somebody who runs a voluntary program. Well, there probably is room 
for both. But if we make the changes in the timeline we need to make 
them, then we’ve got to toughen up here (Sydney City Council, 
15/2/2012 #41). 
 
There was a recognition that … that industry could only go so far … 
We operate in an environment where the market drives a lot of things, 
but in certain areas there needs to be government intervention, or 
government regulation, or government participation in order to push or 
progress the agenda to the point where it needs to move to (Australian 
Sustainable Built Environment Council, 16/11/2011 #21). 
 
That is not to say that interviewees hold that future regulation should replace 
VEGAs. Interviewees shared the opinion that direct governmental regulation may 
improve the uptake and success of VEGAs. Subsequently, on their turn, VEGAs may 
assist in meeting governmental requirements. For instance, the recently 
implemented ‘carbon tax’ (see section 2.1) was considered to be a driver for an 
increased uptake of the discussed VEGAs: 
 
Obviously, being involved in [a VEGA] isn’t mandatory but with carbon 
pricing, it's becoming more important for businesses to prioritize energy 
efficiency (Brisbane City Council, 2/2/2012 #30). 
 
The thing that is starting now, and that will make a difference is the 
cost of energy … People will start looking for ways to reduce costs and 
[this is where VEGAs come in]. Dollar difference is important to them 
(Mirvac [major developer] 17/2/2012 #45). 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
This brief research article studied the emergence and implementation of a range of 
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VEGAs in the Australian building sector. It was found that the individual VEGAs have 
achieved limited success in terms of buildings constructed or retrofitted with high 
levels of environmental performance.  This underlines the critical literature on the 
limited effects of VEGAs (e.g. OECD, 2003). Does this imply that VEGAs should be 
abolished from the environmental governance toolkit? In short, certainly not. Taking 
into account the care that needs to be taken with the mostly qualitative and 
anecdotal data collected, it may be concluded that the VEGAs studied fulfil at least 
four valuable roles in environmental governance in the Australian building sector. 
 First, the VEGAs studied fulfil a transformative role in a perceived change of 
the norm of sustainable practice and behaviour in the Australian building sector. 
These VEGAs allow leaders to showcase their leading practice (and be recognized 
as such), and through collaborative development of VEGAs, various actors in an 
industry may become aware of the environmental issues faced. Yet, as the case 
highlights, such a change of norms should not be expected from the implementation 
of a single VEGA. In the case of the Australian building sector, the various VEGAs 
addressed different actors (i.e., property owners, tenants, households), different 
types of buildings (i.e., commercial, residential, new, existing), and different 
problems (i.e., financing environmental upgrades, regulatory barriers). It is in their 
variety that these VEGAs have a wide reach throughout the sector. 
Second, the VEGAs help to timely fill in voids in formal legislative 
requirements. In the Australian building sector, severe shortfalls in the legislative 
requirements relate to a lack of attention to existing buildings and a lack of attention 
to residential buildings. Many of the VEGAs studied particularly aim to address these 
issues. As opposed to formal legislative requirements, VEGAs may face shorter 
development time, or are less costly to develop as they remain outside the realm of 
formal administrative processes and procedures (cf. Lyon and Maxwell, 2007). As 
one of the interviewees criticized, ‘the Building Codes of Australia [are] very slow 
when it comes to change and taking up environmental issues’ (Brisbane City 
Council, 31/01/2012 #27). It should be noted that this ‘advantage’ of VEGAs’ speedy 
implementation may result in severe accountability issues (Scott and Holder, 2006).  
 Third, the VEGAs studied play a strong role in generating business cases. 
Where traditional steering tools (i.e., direct regulation, subsidies) leave it to policy 
makers to set levels of environmental performance, the various VEGAs discussed 
often leave it to the participants to show improved levels of performance. In 
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particular, best-performance grants and intensive regulatory support appear to be 
tools that challenge participants to make significant advances in terms of innovation 
concerning cost-effective improvements of environmental performance.  
Fourth and finally, the VEGAs studied were considered to fulfil a facilitative 
role in meeting governmental requirements. In the case of carbon pricing in 
particular, it is left to individuals and organizations to reduce their carbon emissions 
(or pay for emitting). VEGAs here may provide ‘evidence based’ approaches for 
doing so. 
To conclude, VEGAs are often considered as an experimental form of 
governance (e.g. Hoffmann, 2011). Experiments are about trial and error. As such 
we may learn valuable lessons from VEGAs: some may prove successful, whilst 
others do not. This study once more showed that VEGAs do not provide a universal 
solution to eliminating environmental risks. Yet, as this study indicated, it is too 
black-and-white to state that without high levels of environmental performance 
VEGAs have no merit. By undertaking subtle roles, they may help to build the critical 
mass that will ultimately achieve the necessary change towards high levels of 
environmental performance in a sector. This implies that governments and non-
governmental individuals and organizations need to think carefully when considering 
VEGAs as an alternative approach to govern environmental risks. As this article has 
made clear, governments may have much to gain when regulated actors collaborate 
with them to achieve far reaching goals in terms of environmental sustainability (i.e., 
the city plans drawn up by the major Australian cities). Thus, showing flexibility 
through collaboration with regulated actors makes sense for governments. However, 
it remains a question why regulated actors would collaborate with governments. As 
this article has made clear, it seems that in the cases studied such participation was 
mostly found when a VEGA clearly addresses the interest of its non-governmental 
participants. Thus, one of the major critical questions for further research to address 
is whether and how VEGAs can be successful if their non-governmental participants 
lack a clear interest. I will address this question in the research that follows from the 
study presented here, and I also challenge my colleagues to take up this question. 
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Appendix A – Interview questions and intervieweews bacjgrounds 
1. Why was [case X] developed and implemented? 
a. Have any program alternatives been considered when the program was 
developed? 
b. Have non-state stakeholders expressed what they are willing to change (as 
considered from the previous/existing governance setting)? 
c. Have non-state stakeholders expressed what they are willing to accept to 
change (as considered from the previous/existing governance setting)? 
d. Was [case X] developed in response to a sudden political problem? (i.e. a 
problem that received considerable public and media attention) 
e. Should I understand [case x] (when it was originally developed) as a 
‘prototype’ to be tested before rolling it out more broadly; or, as an 
experiment open to adaptation and change based on lessons learnt during 
implementation? 
2. Who was involved in the development and implementation of [case X]? 
a. Were/are any parties underrepresented in the development of the case? 
b. Were/are any parties overrepresented in the development of the case? 
c. How was consensus about the case achieved? 
d. To what extent were/are parties satisfied with the case? 
e. What role did/does the government play in the development and 
implementation of the case? 
3. Why do [individuals/organizations] participate in the case? 
a. Does [case x] result in financial gain to participants? (e.g. It gives them a 
market advantage) 
b. Does [case x] provide regulatory/legal relief to participants? If so, is this a 
major reason for participation? 
4. What are the outcomes of [case X]? 
a. How many [individuals/organizations] participate in the case? 
b. How many buildings were [built/retrofitted] under the case? 
c. To what extent do non-participants know about the case? 
5. To what extent may [case X] be considered a success/failure? 
a. In terms of participants? 
b. In terms of buildings [built/retrofitted]? 
c. In terms of achieving actual carbon reductions? 
d. In terms of cost-effectiveness? 
e. In other terms? 
6. What are the main characteristics of [case X] related to this success/failure? 
a. Rules (clearness, adaptability, flexibility)? 
b. Enforcement and monitoring? 
c. Sanctioning (peer pressure, financial incentives, legal measures)? 
d. Rewards (access to information, access to government, public recognition, 
financial gain)? 
e. Other? (e.g. role of government?) 
7. What are the main lessons learnt from developing and implementing [case X?] 
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a. Have these lessons been used to adapt the case? 
b. Are these lessons shared by the other [participants/administrators]?  
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Appendix B – codes used for data analysis 
 
The list below are the codes used for analyzing the data. The data was coded in 
three stages. First a rough coding was carried out (bold codes). Second an 
intermediate coding was carried out (underlined codes). And finally, a fine grained 
coding was carried out (codes in italics). Codes are derived from an extensive review 
of the literature (Van der Heijden, 2012). 
 
Development process 
Collaboration/participation 
Consensus building 
Deliberation/discussion/dialogue 
Heterarchy  
Devolved decision making 
Context based 
Ongoing learning and readjustment 
 
Arrangement structure 
Flexibility 
Transparency 
Soft law mechanisms 
Target and result orientation 
Clear rules 
Adaptable rules 
Enforcement and monitoring 
Self-monitoring 
Administered monitoring 
Third party monitoring 
Government monitoring 
Sanctioning 
Warning 
Financial penalty 
Reputational penalty (shaming) 
Rewards 
Information 
Interaction with government 
Public recognition 
Financial gain 
 
Outcome 
Effective 
Improving environmental 
performance 
Reducing CO2 emissions 
Not effective 
Too slow for change 
Mandatory is needed 
Efficient 
Cost-effective 
Not efficient 
 
Development motivations 
Affirmative 
Showcasing good practice 
Cheaper than formal regulation 
Cost savings 
Green consumers 
Green financing 
Negative 
Prevent future regulation 
Hindering competitors 
Societal pressure 
Worker pressure 
Industry characteristics 
Innovative industry 
Strong internal competition 
Strong international focus 
High organizational capability 
 
Participation motivations 
Affirmative 
Altruism 
Showcasing good practice 
Cost savings (general) 
Energy cost savings 
Green consumers 
Green financing 
Regulatory relief 
Negative 
Peer-pressure 
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Societal-pressure 
Reputational harm 
Liability and legitimacy 
Poor past performance 
 
*** NOTE TO COPY EDITOR: PLEASE TRY TO FIT AS MANY CODES ON ONE 
PAGE – MAYBE A COLUMN STRUCTURE AS SUGGESTED HERE WORKS 
BEST***  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 – Interviewees’ background 
 
Interviewee background Government Non-
government 
Policy maker 4  
Administrator 22 12 
Architect, engineer, advisor  5 
Contractor, developer  3 
Property owner  4 
Other  3 
Total 26 27 
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Table 2 – the specific problems and problem owners the VEGAs studied address, 
and their approach 
 
Specific problem Problem owners VEGAs (and 
reach) 
Approach (and 
type) 
First-mover 
disadvantages 
(government 
driven) 
Developers, 
builders and 
owners of new and 
existing 
commercial 
buildings; and new 
and existing 
residential 
buildings  
Buildings 
Innovation Fund 
(South Australia); 
Sustainable 
Development Grant 
(Brisbane); Smart 
Green Apartments 
(Sydney); Lord 
Mayor Grant 
(Brisbane); Zero 
Carbon Challenge 
(South Australia) 
Financial 
incentives 
(Best-performance 
grants) 
First-mover 
disadvantages  
(specific regulatory 
barriers) 
Developers and 
future owners of 
new commercial 
and residential 
buildings 
Green Door 
(Queensland) 
Regulatory relief 
(Intensive 
regulatory support) 
First-mover 
disadvantages 
(market driven) 
Developers, 
builders and 
owners of new and 
existing 
commercial and 
residential 
buildings 
EnviroDevelopment 
(Australia-wide); 
Green Star 
(Australia-wide) 
Marketing 
performance 
(best-of-class 
benchmarking) 
Split incentives 
(property owners) 
Owners of existing 
commercial 
buildings 
1200 Buildings 
(Melbourne); 
Environmental 
Upgrade 
Agreements 
(Sydney) 
Financial 
intercession 
(Tripartite 
financing)  
Split incentives 
 (tenants) 
Tenants of existing 
commercial 
buildings 
CitySwitch Green 
Office (Australia-
wide) 
Information 
collection and 
sharing  
(Information 
networks) 
Split incentives 
(on precinct level) 
Major property 
owners 
Better Building 
Partnership 
Information sharing 
(Elite networks) 
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(Sydney) 
Residential 
buildings 
Households Climate Smart 
Home Service 
(Brisbane); Energy 
Efficiency Program 
for Low Income 
Households 
(Adelaide); 
ResourceSmart 
(Melbourne) 
Information sharing 
(Intensive 
behavioural 
interventions) 
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